Defense

Cut Non-Defense Spending from the Defense Department Budget

RECOMMENDATION

Congress and various Administrations have used the Defense Department (DOD) to fund programs that are not related to military capabilities. This proposal saves $514 million in FY 2018.

RATIONALE

The Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs (CDMRP) is one of the oldest and largest examples of non-defense funding inside the DOD budget. It was started by Congress in FY 1992 and $11 billion has been appropriated by Congress since then. While some of this funding goes to medical research for issues that are relevant to the DOD, such as post-traumatic stress or orthotics, in FY 2016 alone Congress appropriated $235 million to research non-defense medical issues including: breast, ovarian and prostate cancer; epilepsy; and autism. This funding for non-defense research should be eliminated.

Another set of non-defense programs that should be cut from defense spending are what the DOD Comptroller calls "civil military programs." These include a DOD education program called STARBASE and the National Guard Youth Challenge Program. This category has grown from $122 million in FY 2007 to $196 million in FY 2016.[1] Eliminating civil military programs would save $195 million in FY 2018.

Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) programs demonstrably help the young enrollees to mature and grow into responsible adults, but there is no evidence that the programs lead to individuals enlisting in the military at a rate higher than average. In FY 2016, the four services received $304 million to fund JROTC programs (including $87 million for the Navy, $23 million for the Marines, $175 million for the Army, and $55 million for the Air Force).[2] The programs should be phased out, allowing current participants to finish, but no new ones to join. By phasing out the programs with a 25 percent reduction in year one, this proposal would save $85 million in FY 2018.

The DOD Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program is a partnership between the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which allows schools to use USDA entitlement dollars to buy fresh produce through the DLA. While the USDA budget provides the entitlement dollars, the DLA commits time, personnel, and resources toward the collection and delivery of approximately $200 million in fresh produce annually. The budget documents are not clear if the DLA passes the costs of this program to the USDA, and thus no estimated savings are included for this proposal, but this is not a DOD mission and should not be part of the DOD's budget.

Climate change and "green" energy were a high priority for the Obama Administration, but were not related to greater military strength. While an initial search of publicly available DOD contracting data shows that only $5 million has been spent on climate-change-driven actions since 2009, this does not include the internal costs of time and attention resulting from prioritizing climate change over more pressing security concerns. However, the same data show that over $100 million was spent over the same period on "green" or "alternative" energy projects across the DOD. Additionally, Congress has imposed a green energy mandate that requires 25 percent of electricity used by the DOD to come from renewable sources by 2025. Congress should repeal this mandate. No estimated savings are included for this proposal, as the level of savings is highly uncertain.

ADDITIONAL READING

- Rachel Zissimos and Katie Tubb, "The New Administration's Policy Should Reflect that Biofuels Cannot Meet Military Needs," Heritage Foundation *Issue Brief* No. 4643, January 4, 2017.
- Senator Tom A. Coburn, "Department of Everything," November 2012.
- Brian Slattery and Michaela Dodge, "Biofuel Blunder: Navy Should Prioritize Fleet Modernization over Political Initiatives," Heritage Foundation *Issue Brief* No. 4054, September 24, 2013.
- Jack Spencer, "Capability, Not Politics, Should Drive DOD Energy Research," Heritage Foundation *WebMemo* No. 3299, June 22, 2011.

CALCULATIONS

Savings represent budgetary authority levels and were estimated based on FY 2016 enacted spending levels. This estimate assumes that the FY 2016 enacted levels hold steady in FY 2017 and decrease slightly in FY 2018 (–0.32 percent) in accordance with discretionary spending growth, according to the CBO's most recent August 2016 baseline spending projections. CDMRP spending levels by category can be found at Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs, "About Us: Funding History," http://cdmrp.army.mil/about/fundinghistory (accessed February 6, 2017). Civil Military Program spending can be found at Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), "Fiscal year 2017 President's Budget: Civil Military Programs," February 2016, p. CMP-22, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2017/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PART_1/CMP_OP-5.pdf (accessed February 6, 2017). JROTC spending levels are found at Department of the Navy, "Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Estimates: Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN)," February 2016, p. 397, http://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/17pres/OMN_Vol1_book.pdf (accessed February 6, 2017) for the Navy; Department of the Navy, "Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Estimates: Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps," February 2016, p. 117, http://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/17pres/OMMC_Book.pdf (accessed February 6, 2017) for the Marine Corps; Department of the Army, "Fiscal year 2017 Budget Estimates: Volume 1–Operation and Maintenance, Army," February 2016, p. 456, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/budgetmaterials/fy17/opmaint//oma-v1.pdf (accessed February 6, 2017) for the Army; and Department of the Air Force, "Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Estimates: Operation and Maintenance, Air Force–Volume 1," p. 536, http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY17/AFD-160205-032.pdf?ver=2016-08-24-101954-513 (accessed February 6, 2017) for the Air Force. JROTC spending totals $340 million across the four defense branches, and this spending level is reduced by 25 percent in FY 2018, generating savings of $85 million.

Combine Military Exchanges and Commissaries and Reduce Commissary Subsidies

RECOMMENDATION

The Defense Department should reduce commissary subsidies by 20 percent, and combine its exchange and commissary systems in order to provide goods more efficiently. This proposal saves $286 million in FY 2018.

RATIONALE

The DOD currently has an extensive and separate retail network to serve military members and their dependents. There are four different retail systems operated by the DOD. One of them, the commissaries, is a network of grocery stores, available to all branches of the military. In addition to commissaries, the military has three separate general-retail stores (exchanges), one for the Army and Air Force, one for the Navy, and another for the Marine Corps.

Commissaries and exchanges are managed differently. All three of the exchanges are self-sustaining, relying on the revenue from their sales rather than direct appropriations. Commissaries, which are run by the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA), rely on an annual subsidy to pay for their civilian workforce. Unlike the exchanges, the commissaries do not mark up the prices enough to fully fund their operations. In FY 2016, the subsidy was $1.435 billion.

The FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) allows the Secretary of Defense to take steps toward common management of the exchanges and commissaries. Congress and the Secretary should continue this effort with the goal of providing service members affordable access to goods with few or no subsidies being provided by taxpayers. In those areas where sufficient private grocery and retail outlets operate, it is reasonable to expect that government commissaries and exchanges could be phased out completely. In order to prevent fiscal hardship for the most junior service members, a needs-based system could be employed to provide them with a pre-loaded credit card, which could be used for groceries to cushion them from the increased prices.

ADDITIONAL READING

- Mackenzie Eaglen and Julia Pollack, "How to Save Money, Reform Processes, and Increase Efficiency in the Defense Department," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 2507, January 10, 2011.
- Congressional Budget Office, "Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options," March 2011.

CALCULATIONS

Savings are expressed as budget authority based on the FY 2016 enacted subsidy level of $1.435 billion as found in Defense Commissary Agency, "Fiscal Year 2017 President's Budget," pp. 15 and 16, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2017/budget_justification/pdfs/06_Defense_Working_Capital_Fund/DeCA_FY2017_PB.pdf (accessed February 6, 2017). This estimate assumes that the $1.435 billion budget authority level holds steady in FY 2017, and decreases at the same rate as discretionary spending in FY 2018 (–0.32 percent) as projected in the CBO's most recent August 2016 baseline spending projections. The savings assume a 20 percent reduction of $286 million from the estimated FY 2018 subsidy of $1.43 billion.

Close Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools

RECOMMENDATION

Close the Defense Department's Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS) on military bases in the continental United States. Based on a phased-in closing with a 25 percent reduction in total spending in year one, this proposal saves $150 million in FY 2018.

RATIONALE

The DOD currently operates over 170 schools around the world, including 62 schools in the United States. While overseas schools supporting military dependents make sense, the domestic schools are a legacy system from the years of segregation that should be re-examined. DDESS operates 62 domestic schools in seven states (Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia), the Territory of Guam, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. States with major military bases that do not have DDESS schools are Florida, Texas, and Colorado. The domestic schools cost the DOD over $600 million in FY 2016 (versus $360 million in FY 2007) and have more staff per students than DOD overseas schools. The cost per student in DDESS schools is roughly double the national average.

There is no need for the military to be operating schools in these states, and the Pentagon should promptly take action to initiate the process to close the schools and transfer military dependents to local school systems. The necessary amount of Impact Aid would then be provided to the local school systems to cover the incremental cost to educate the students.

ADDITIONAL READING

- Fiscal Commission, "$200 Billion in Illustrative Savings [for 2015]," November 12, 2010.
- Senator Tom A. Coburn, "Department of Everything," November 2012.

CALCULATIONS

Savings are expressed as budget authority and are based on the FY 2016 enacted spending level of $602 billion for DDESS, as found in Department of Defense, "Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Estimates Department of Defense Dependents Education (DoDDE)," p. DoDDE-327, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2017/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PART_1/DoDDE-OP-5.pdf (accessed February 6, 2017). This estimate assumes that the FY 2016 level holds constant in FY 2017 and decreases at the same rate as discretionary spending (–0.32 percent) according to the CBO's most recent August 2016 baseline spending projections. The estimated savings assume a phased-in reduction in DDESS spending, amounting to a 25 percent cut in FY 2018.

Reform Military Health Care

RECOMMENDATION

In the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress took a significant first step toward reforming military compensation. Congress must next reform the military's health care system by introducing a private-sector health insurance option for military family members. This proposal saves $3.9 billion in FY 2018, but would require both authorization and appropriations changes.

RATIONALE

Military health care costs represent a significant portion of the personnel budget, and have faced upward pressure. In FY 2016, the Defense Department spent $32.9 billion on its Health Program and another $6.6 billion on retiree health care accruals for Medicare-eligible service members.[3] The military must be able to care for the men and women in uniform, particularly when they are in combat, but much of the military health care system has evolved into providing care for military dependents. This system is both expensive and does not give military family members much choice or flexibility. Implementing a private-sector health insurance system would dramatically increase access and options for military family members while also reducing costs.

A variety of proposals exist to implement such a plan. A 2011 Heritage Foundation report proposed moving service members and their dependents to the system currently used by civilian federal employees, which would save $1.4 billion in the first year and significantly more in future years.[4]

In January 2015, the congressionally chartered Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission (MCRMC) issued its final report and included a recommendation to allow military dependents to choose from a selection of commercial health insurance plans. The MCRMC estimated that this would save $3.9 billion in the first year and more in the future.

ADDITIONAL READING

- Baker Spring, "Saving the American Dream: Improving Health Care and Retirement for Military Service Members and Their Families," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 2621, November 17, 2011.
- Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission, *Report of the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission: Final Report*, January 2015, Appendix D, p. 262.

CALCULATIONS

Savings are based on the implementation of the MCRMC's Recommendation 6 as outlined in its final report. The commission estimates that this proposal would save $3.9 billion in the first year, and more than $6 billion per year once fully implemented.

Increase Use of Performance-Based Logistics

RECOMMENDATION

The Department of Defense should increase the use of the performance-based-logistics (PBL) method in weapon-systems maintenance and sustainment. This proposal saves $9 billion in FY 2018 but requires changes in both authorization and appropriations bills.

RATIONALE

To operate a weapon system, the DOD must pay for the full life-cycle cost of the equipment, which includes the development and procurement of the system, as well as the far more costly maintenance and sustainment of the weapon system. The DOD spends about $90 billion on maintenance and sustainment of weapon systems each year.[5]

PBL is a proven method used for sustainment work that enhances the military capability and availability of weapon systems at a lower cost. Rather than measuring stovepipe metrics, such as number of aircraft repaired or the quantity of repair parts acquired, the PBL approach uses metrics that measure whether the system is meeting the capability requirements for the warfighters. In other words, the PBL method emphasizes the readiness of the platform as the desired outcome.

The benefits of PBL have been known in the Pentagon for a while, and are even listed as the preferred practice in DOD acquisition regulations. A DOD report has also verified that PBL practices, when implemented correctly, lead to both cost savings and improved system performance.[6] That being said, PBL is not appropriate for all systems and should be applied judiciously. Furthermore, existing barriers and cultural biases against PBL would make a universal application unfeasible. For those reasons, cost savings for the effort vary from $9 billion a year to $32 billion a year.[7]

ADDITIONAL READING

- Baker Spring, "Performance-Based Logistics: Making the Military More Efficient," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 2411, May 6, 2010.
- Mackenzie Eaglen and Julia Pollack, "How to Save Money, Reform Processes, and Increase Efficiency in the Defense Department," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 2507, January 10, 2011.

CALCULATIONS

Savings are expressed as budget authority and were calculated based on a range of estimated savings from two reports: John Boyce and Allan Banghart, "Performance Based Logistics and Project Proof Point," *Defense AT&L: Product Support Issue* (March–April 2012), http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/ATL%20Docs/Mar_Apr_2012/Boyce_Banghart.pdf (accessed February 6, 2017), and Aerospace Industries Association, "Modernizing Defense Logistics," June 25, 2009, https://www.aia-aerospace.org/assets/paper_v1_0_6_25_09_rr.pdf (accessed February 6, 2017). The estimates of cost savings range from a notably conservative, or low, level of $9 billion per year to $32 billion per year. Heritage conservatively assumes that the DOD would initially realize the lowest range of these savings, at $9 billion per year in FY 2018, with that figure growing to $32 billion per year over the 10-year period (growing at an annual rate of 15.1 percent).

Return Defense Agencies to 2011 Levels

RECOMMENDATION

Return "Fourth Estate" defense agencies' spending to 2011 levels. This proposal saves $102 million in FY 2018.

RATIONALE

The DOD Fourth Estate, which consists of entities that are not part of military departments of the combatant commands, has grown significantly over the past decade. While some of this growth may be legitimately mission-driven, some of the growth can likely be curtailed and produce modest savings.

The bulk of the military's fighting capability and budget is located within the DOD's three military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force). Defense agencies and some joint capabilities are funded through "defense-wide" budget accounts. Defense-wide funding has increased from $75 billion in FY 2007 to a peak of $103 billion in FY 2012. After sequestration, it fell to a low of $94 billion before growing back to $100 billion in FY 2016.

Unless there is a clear military necessity, Fourth Estate defense agencies should return to FY 2011 levels. Some defense agencies have reduced their spending levels since 2011, and they should be held constant. At least four defense-wide accounts should return to FY 2011 levels: Defense Contract Audit Agency, Defense Contract Management Agency, Defense Legal Services Agency, and Washington Headquarters Service. This would save $103 million in FY 2018.

CALCULATIONS

Savings represent budget authority and were based on FY 2016 enacted spending levels. This estimate assumes that the FY 2016 level holds constant in FY 2017 and decreases at the same rate as discretionary spending (–0.32 percent) according to the CBO's most recent August 2016 baseline spending projections. FY 2016 spending levels can be found in multiple budget documents all contained in the U.S. Defense Department, "FY 2017 Budget Justification," http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf (accessed February 6, 2017). Heritage compared these FY 2018 projected levels to the FY 2011 enacted levels, increased for inflation to reflect real, 2018 dollars. The savings equal the difference between projected FY 2018 levels and the levels that would exist if spending were held constant in real terms at 2011 levels.

Reduce Excess Base Infrastructure

RECOMMENDATION

Reduce excess base infrastructure. Heritage does not include any estimated savings in FY 2018, but this proposal will produce up to $2 billion in savings annually once implemented.

RATIONALE

Since the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense has tried to reduce its physical infrastructure (bases and facilities) to match current military needs. Today, the U.S. military needs to grow in size, but the infrastructure supporting the military should be thoroughly re-examined. According to recent DOD estimates, the military has approximately 22 percent excess capacity, ranging from 7 percent in the Navy to 33 percent in the Army.[8] As the military grows, it is unlikely to need the same types of facilities it needed in the 1980s. While some excess infrastructure may be worth keeping, as a hedge against future needs, the DOD cannot even thoroughly analyze the issue today due to congressional restrictions.

Congress routinely blocks DOD efforts to right-size their infrastructure. The last time the DOD was able to do this was during the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. Since 2012, the DOD has asked for BRAC authority every year, and every year Congress has rejected it. At the same time that Congress works to expand the military, Congress should allow the DOD to conduct a rigorous and transparent review of its current and future infrastructure needs, including closing bases and facilities as appropriate. While this process will come with an up-front cost, DOD estimates that once fully implemented it could save $2 billion annually.

ADDITIONAL READING

- Michaela Dodge, "Beyond BRAC: Global Defense Infrastructure for the 21st Century," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 2791, May 3, 2013.
- Joe Gould and Aaron Mehta, "Pentagon to Congress: We Need Base Closures," *Defense News*, April 15, 2016.
- William D. Hartung, "A New BRAC Round Would Boost Readiness, Save Billions," *The Hill*, May 21, 2014.

CALCULATIONS

Although Heritage does not include any savings from this proposal for FY 2018, the Department of Defense estimates that once fully implemented, a BRAC would save $2 billion annually. FY 2017 Defense Budget Overview, pp. 2–4, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf (accessed February 6, 2017).

Reform the Basic Allowance for Housing

RECOMMENDATION

Reform the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) to better match actual housing spending. This proposal saves $116 million in FY 2018.

RATIONALE

The DOD spent over $5.8 billion in Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH).[9] This allowance is designed to help service members pay for housing. This is not military compensation. Housing allowances should be based on the amount of money that service members must pay to obtain adequate housing. Service members are not entitled to, nor should they have any expectation, that money above what they pay for housing can be retained as "extra compensation." In the consideration of the FY 2017 NDAA, Congress attempted to return to validated housing costs, but ultimately retreated in the face of opposition from members of the House of Representatives and others. Opponents of the change claim that it is "taking money out of the pockets of service members." This is a mischaracterization of the purpose of the BAH. It is solely designed to defray the costs of housing. Yet, a U.S. Army Audit Agency report estimated that married service members receive $200 million more in BAH than their actual housing costs.

In the FY 2017 NDAA, Congress considered returning the BAH to an allowance based on evidentiary proof (a lease or mortgage) of the amount of money that service members spend on housing. Additionally, Congress proposed an allowance for married service members based on what they actually spend, as opposed to a double allowance. These changes would reduce costs and are completely appropriate. Congress should phase in more accurate housing allowances beginning with the FY 2018 NDAA. This would save an estimated $116 million in FY 2018.

ADDITIONAL READING

- Senate Armed Services Committee Report, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017," p. 163, http://www.dtic.mil/congressional_budget/pdfs/FY2017_pdfs/SASC/SASC_Report-CRPT-114srpt255.pdf (accessed February 2, 2017).

CALCULATIONS

While the exact level of savings is uncertain (and more accurate allowances could change behaviors and affect actual housing costs), Heritage estimates that a phased-in approach would reduce BAH costs by 2 percent in FY 2018, rising to 8 percent in FY 2021. In FY 2016, the DOD spent $5.826 billion on BAH. This estimate assumes that this level holds constant in FY 2017 and decreases at the same rate as discretionary spending (–0.32 percent) in FY 2018, according to the CBO's most recent August 2016 baseline spending projections. Two percent of the estimated FY 2018 level of $5.809 billion equals $116 million.

End Renewable Energy Mandates in the Department of Defense

RECOMMENDATION

End renewable energy mandates in the Department of Defense. This proposal has uncertain savings and thus none are included for FY 2018.

RATIONALE

Such mandates undermine the incentive for producers of renewable energy to develop competitively priced products, thereby *impeding* marketplace diversity. In particular, under Section 2911(e) of Title 10 of the United States Code, the Defense Department is obligated to produce or procure 25 percent of the energy consumed in DOD facilities from renewable sources by 2025. This mandate, which is forcing the Pentagon to expend ever more resources on renewable energy rather than on military capability, should be ended immediately.[10]

In regard to operational energy initiatives, all programs should be driven by their contribution to military capability or their cost-saving potential. Accordingly, Congress should remove grandfather clauses that circumvent requirements that all federal energy investments be "the most cost effective, expedient, and practical alternative method for meeting the need."[11] Under the Obama Administration, the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Agriculture used funds through the Defense Production Act and Commodity Credit Corporation to fund purchases of expensive, uncompetitive biofuels while hiding true costs from taxpayers. Congress has also unnecessarily constrained possible fueling options with a greenhouse gas emissions cap in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 by forbidding alternative fuels with lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions that exceed those of conventional petroleum.

Fuel is as much an asset as it is a point of vulnerability for the military. In order to protect taxpayers from undue energy expense by the DOD, Congress should remove technology-specific and fuel-specific mandates from the military.

ADDITIONAL READING

- Brian Slattery and Michaela Dodge, "Biofuel Blunder: Navy Should Prioritize Fleet Modernization over Political Initiatives," Heritage Foundation *Issue Brief* No. 4054, September 24, 2013.
- Jack Spencer, "Capability, Not Politics, Should Drive DOD Energy Research," Heritage Foundation *WebMemo* No. 3299, June 22, 2011.

CALCULATIONS

While this proposal will almost certainly improve efficiency and generate significant cost savings, Heritage does not have a reliable estimate of the costs of the Defense Department's recent renewable energy mandates, and does not include any estimated savings here.

ENDNOTES

1. Department of Defense, "Fiscal Year 2017 President's Budget, Civil Military Programs," February 2016, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2017/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PART_1/CMP_OP-5.pdf (accessed February 2, 2017).
2. Department of the Navy, "Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Estimates: Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN)," February 2016, p. 397, http://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/17pres/OMN_Vol1_book.pdf (accessed February 2, 2017); Department of the Navy, "Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Estimates: Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps," February 2016, p. 117, http://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/17pres/OMMC_Book.pdf (accessed February 2, 2017); Department of the Army, "Fiscal year 2017 Budget Estimates: Volume 1–Operation and Maintenance, Army," February 2016, p. 456, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/budgetmaterials/fy17/opmaint//oma-v1.pdf (accessed February 2, 2017); and Department of the Air Force, "Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Estimates: Operation and Maintenance, Air Force–Volume 1," p. 536, http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY17/AFD-160205-032.pdf?ver=2016-08-24-101954-513 (accessed February 2, 2017).
3. Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), "Defense Budget Overview: Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request," February 2016, p. 6–2, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf (accessed February 2, 2017).
4. Baker Spring, "Saving the American Dream: Improving Health Care and Retirement for Military Service Members and Their Families," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 2621, November 17, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/11/saving-the-american-dream-improving-health-care-and-retirement-for-military-service-members.
5. John Boyce and Allan Banghart, "Performance Based Logistics and Project Proof Point," *Defense AT&L: Product Support Issue* (March–April 2012), p. 30, http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/ATL%20Docs/Mar_Apr_2012/Boyce_Banghart.pdf (accessed December 29, 2015).
6. Ibid.
7. Baker Spring, "Performance-Based Logistics: Making the Military More Efficient," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 2411, May 6, 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/05/performance-based-logistics-making-the-military-more-efficient, and Boyce and Banghart, "Performance Based Logistics and Project Proof Point."
8. Joe Gould and Aaron Mehta, "Pentagon to Congress: We Need Base Closures," *Defense News*, April 15, 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/04/15/pentagon-requests-brac/83082038/ (accessed February 2, 2017).
9. Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), "Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 2017L Military Personnel Programs (M-1)," February 2016, p. 16, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/fy2017_m1.pdf (accessed February 2, 2017).
10. Jack Spencer, "Capability, Not Politics, Should Drive DOD Energy Research," Heritage Foundation *WebMemo* No. 3299, June 22, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/capability-not-politics-should-drive-dod-energy-research.
11. Jared T. Brown and Daniel H. Else, "The Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and Reauthorizaton," Congressional Research Service, July 28, 2014, p. 14, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43118.pdf (accessed February 2, 2017).